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INTRODUCTION
Last Term, the Supreme Court upheld for the first time Congress's
effort to enforce the Due Process Clause. In Tennessee v. Lane, the Court
considered whether Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority in
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by requiring states to
provide accessible courthouses for disabled people like George Lane.'
Respondent Lane was arrested after refusing to crawl or be carried up two
flights of stairs to face a misdemeanor charge on the second floor of a
courthouse with no elevator. He sued Tennessee for failing to comply with
Congress's courthouse-accessibility mandate. Reviewing Title II of the
ADA, the Court validated Congress's exercise of its Fourteenth
Amendment Section 5 power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 2 the
Due Process Clause guarantees of courthouse access for all citizens,
including people with disabilities.
3
The result in Lane was received as "unexpected,"4 standing out from
recent decisions in which the Court had dramatically constrained
Congress's Section 5 power. In the seven years prior to Lane, the Rehnquist
Court had invalidated five different laws-including three landmark civil
rights laws-on the ground that Congress had exceeded its power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Animating these rulings was the
central claim that Congress may only use its Section 5 power to enforce
judicial articulations of Fourteenth Amendment rights, not its own
interpretation of those rights. Robert Post and Reva Siegel have aptly
characterized this Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence as "juricentric"
because it reflects a vision of the Constitution in which interpretive
1. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
3. Lane marked the fourth time that the Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari on the
constitutional validity of Title II. See Med. Bd. v. Hason, 537 U.S. 1028 (2002), cert. dismissed,
538 U.S. 958 (2003); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001) ("To the extent the
Court granted certiorari on the question whether respondents may sue their state employers for
damages under Title II of the ADA ... that portion of the writ is dismissed as improvidently
granted."); Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999 (8th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (holding that
Title II of the ADA exceeded Congress's Section 5 power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity), cert. granted sub nom. Alsbrook v. Arkansas, 528 U.S. 1146, cert.
dismissed, 529 U.S. 1001 (2000).
4. Anne Gearan, High Court Boosts Civil Rights for People with Disabilities; Disability Law
Applied to States, CHARLESTON (W. Va.) GAZETTE, May 18, 2004, at 2A.
5. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (Title I of the ADA); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (Violence Against Women Act of 1994); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Patent Remedy Act); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997) (Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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authority is concentrated exclusively in the judiciary.6 Additionally, in
recent decisions the Court had invoked federalism concerns to further
constrain Section 5, holding that states' sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment justifies restricting otherwise legitimate Section 5
legislation. These judicial conditions on the Section 5 power left deep
uncertainty about the federal government's capacity to establish
constitutional standards that bind the states according to the rights
enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment.
Lane is innovative in several respects. It is the first case to validate a
Section 5 statute enforcing the Due Process Clause. It is the first to consider
a Section 5 statute that enforced multiple constitutional rights. It is the first
to address explicitly the question of whether Section 5 legislation should be
evaluated on its face or only as applied to the circumstances of a particular
case. In all of these areas, Lane raises new questions about the relationship
between the Court and Congress in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.
Measuring Lane against the juricentric rulings that characterized the
period from 1997 to 2001, some commentators have interpreted the case as
signaling "a significant break from recent decisions."7 Indeed, only three
years earlier in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court rejected Congress's
Section 5 authority to prohibit employment discrimination against
individuals with disabilities through Title I of the ADA.8 Others, by
contrast, have criticized Lane for refusing to validate all of Title 119 and
instead reaching only those aspects of Title II that require access to
courthouses. The question is whether Lane simply reflects the compelling
facts of that case or rather represents a broader shift in the Court's attitude
toward congressional power.
This Note argues that, although Lane affirms the Court's juricentric
review framework for testing the validity of Section 5 laws, the Court
applied this model in important new ways to vindicate a more expansive
6. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003); see also Ruth Colker & James J.
Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 85 (2001) (arguing that the Court is deploying
what they call "crystal ball" and "phantom legislative history" methodologies in order to
subordinate Congress to its own vision of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement); Neal Kumar
Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1360-82 (2001) (arguing
that the emerging review framework for Section 5 hinges Congress's power to interpret the Equal
Protection Clause solely on the Court's own dispositive constitutional vision of Section 1).
7. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Find States Can Be Liable for Not Making Courthouses
Accessible to Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2004, at A20.
8. 531 U.S. at 360. Prior to Lane, those concerned with preserving the scope of disability
discrimination law feared that Garrett would be applied to similarly invalidate Congress's Section
5 power for Title II of the ADA. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 653 (2000); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1075
(2004).
9. See, e.g., Valerie Jablow, Court-Access Decision's Narrow Scope Worries Advocates for
Disabled, TRIAL, July 2004, at 92.
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Section 5 power for Congress. Through a series of doctrinal innovations,
Lane strikes a new balance of judicial and legislative enforcement powers
that ultimately preserves for the courts exclusive interpretive authority,
while providing Congress greater discretion to design innovative
enforcement legislation that is binding on the states. This Note
demonstrates that Lane possesses far-reaching implications for future
judicial review of Congress's Section 5 legislation.
In Part I of this Note, I examine how the Lane Court affirmed the
doctrinal tests used to invalidate Title I of the ADA while, at the same time,
upholding a nearly identical antidiscrimination mandate in Title II of the
ADA. By identifying the key features of Lane's Section 5 review, this Part
reveals the compatibility between the Court's stringent review conditions
and its validation of Due Process Clause enforcement.
Parts II and III then consider the scope-of-review puzzles posed by
Title II's enforcement of multiple constitutional rights. As these Parts show,
the Court expanded legislative authority even while restricting its holding to
the specific context of courthouse access. Part II argues that Lane retains
juricentric restrictions on Section 5 by using, for the first time, an as-
applied methodology to test Congress's invocation of the Section 5 power.
Part III then demonstrates that, despite its narrow holding, Lane vindicates
more expansive authority for congressional remedies based on broader
pragmatic considerations of the "gravity of the harm"' stemming from
Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Finally, Part IV shows how Lane distinguishes its Section 5 review
framework from the Eleventh Amendment federalism concerns used in
recent decisions to restrict otherwise valid Section 5 legislation. Through
the lens of Due Process Clause enforcement, Lane exposes the true stakes
of these previous Section 5 rulings by revealing their threat to the national
government's power to enforce constitutional rights standards against the
states.
By examining how the Court combined a juricentric vision with a
validation of Congress's power to use Section 5 to enforce Due Process
Clause rights, this Note reveals Lane to be a potential ttning point in the
Court's Section 5 jurisprudence. While some interpret Lane to mark a
"congressional power day"'" and others criticize it as a narrow exception to
the Court's encroachment on legislative enforcement,' 2 this Note challenges
both interpretations as incomplete. The Court's juricentric logic continues
to formally deny Congress the independent authority to interpret the
10. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1988 (2004).
11. Posting of Marty Lederman to SCOTUSblog, http://www.goldsteinhowe.com/blog/
archive/2004_05_16_SCOTUSblog.cfmn (May 17, 2004, 10:04 EST).
12. See, e.g., Jablow, supra note 9, at 92.
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Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, this Note shows important ways in
which Lane's analytic structure implicitly validates more expansive
authority for Congress to give practical content to constitutional values
through remedial legislation. Thus, by explicating the doctrinal and
conceptual changes that drive the Court's analysis in Lane, this Note
reveals how the Court has begun to create room for a more balanced
relationship between the judicial and legislative powers to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment.
I. THE ENFORCEMENT MODEL LIVES
At issue in Lane was the validity of a disabled person's damages suit
against Tennessee for its failure to enforce the accessibility requirements in
Title II of the ADA. Under its Section 5 power, Congress passed Title 1113
as a constitutionally binding requirement on the states: "[N]o qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded
from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity."' 14 Invoking this legal prohibition against their exclusion, six citizens
brought damages suits against Tennessee for failing to make state
courthouses accessible to people with physical disabilities.
George Lane, a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair, was one of the
individuals who challenged his exclusion from the courtroom.15 When
Tennessee prosecuted Lane on criminal misdemeanor charges, the state
judge refused to move from a second-floor courtroom to one on the ground
floor or to make a reasonable accommodation so that Lane could be present
for his trial. The judge subsequently ordered law enforcement officers to
arrest Lane after he refused to crawl or be carried up two flights of stairs to
appear at his trial.16 Lane argued that Tennessee's failure to make the
courthouse accessible was precisely the type of constitutional violation that
Congress sought to eliminate by invoking the "sweep of congressional
authority" 7 to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Tennessee sought to
dismiss Lane's suit on the ground that "Title II of the ADA exceeds
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
14. Id. § 12132.
15. Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. at 15, Lane (No. 02-1667).
16. Id.
17. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(b)(4), 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (2000)); see also
42 U.S.C. § 12202 ("A State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment to the
Constitution of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction
for a violation of this chapter." (footnote omitted)).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2005] 1137
The Yale Law Journal
Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate
the sovereign immunity of the States." 8
In evaluating Lane's holding, Section A explicates the requirements of
the Court's current review framework, revealing two key conditions
imposed by the Court as prerequisites for valid congressional enforcement.
Section B explains how the Court deployed these constraining conditions
and nevertheless validated Title II's courthouse-accessibility mandate based
on analytically distinct features of congressional Due Process Clause
enforcement.
A. The Rehnquist Court Reconstruction
In 1997, the Rehnquist Court began narrowing the scope of Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority by claiming that Section 5
legislation could represent a direct threat to the "separation of powers and
the federal balance." 19 Breaking with decades of substantial deference to
Congress over Section 5 lawmaking,20 the Court in City ofBoerne v. Flores
invalidated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which
Congress had defiantly passed to overrule an earlier Court decision.21 While
cloaking its new approach in language of "wide latitude, 22 the Court
insisted that Congress's Section 5 authority was limited by the judiciary's
"duty to say what the law is": 23 "Congress' power under § 5 ... extends
only to 'enforc[ing]' the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
18. Brief for Petitioner at 15, Lane (No. 02-1667).
19. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
20. Prior to 1997, the Court granted broad discretion to Congress to enact Section 5 laws in
the longstanding tradition of rational basis review that began with McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). So long as the Court could perceive some rational basis for the law's
Section 5 grounding, Congress's authority would be respected. Extensive scholarly inquiry has
traced the link between McCulloch and the Framers' expected standard of "appropriate
legislation" for Section 5 enforcement by Congress. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate"
Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1129-33, 1158-65 (2001);
Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of
Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 118; Steven A. Engel, Note, The
McCulloch Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment: City of Boerne v. Flores and the Original
Understanding of Section 5, 109 YALE L.J. 115, 122-45 (1999).
21. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a discussion of this sharp break
with decades of deference, see, for example, Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996
Term-Comment: Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARV. L. REV. 153 (1997). But see Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett, and
Protection for Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1183, 1210-13 (2002) (arguing that Garrett restricted
Congress's authority consistent with previous decisions); Lawrence G. Sager, Congress as
Partner / Congress as Adversary, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 89 (1998) ("The villain here is
Congress, not the Court .... Boerne, correctly understood, enforces a plausible boundary between
the authority of the Court and that of Congress.").
22. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
23. Id. at 536 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is. ,,24
Across six decisions, the Rehnquist Court then constructed a
completely new doctrinal framework to test Section 5 laws-a juricentric
"enforcement model" 25-reflecting the essential premise that "Congress can
use its Section 5 power only to enforce constitutional meanings that the
Court itself is prepared to enforce pursuant to Section 1."26 In this
framework the Court asks, first, whether Congress's Section 5 power is
appropriately invoked and, second, whether the actual Section 5 law crafted
by Congress is an appropriate remedy. In Garrett, the Rehnquist Court held
that Congress could not activate its Section 5 power unless it first
demonstrated that states had systematically violated citizens' Fourteenth
Amendment rights as the Court was prepared to define those rights.
Because this requirement conditions any exercise of Section 5 power upon
the demonstration that constitutional rights have been violated, I call it the
"rights condition." 27 In Boerne, the Rehnquist Court had held that Congress
could not exercise its Section 5 power unless it passed legislation that
created a "congruent and proportional" response to these violations of
constitutional rights.28 Because this restriction conditions the exercise of
Section 5 power on the issuance of a proper remedy, I call it the "remedial
condition."
Within this framework, the rights condition itself imposes two distinct
requirements. First, Congress must document, to the Court's satisfaction, a
"history and pattern" of state violations.29 Second, these transgressions must
be unconstitutional according to the Court's prior Section 1 decisions,30
which means that Congress can use its Section 5 power only if it first
demonstrates violations of rights that a court itself would remedy pursuant
to Section 1. This rights condition therefore imposes substantive as well as
24. Id. at 519 (alteration in original).
25. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1946
(2003); see also id. at 2058 ("The theoretical engine of the Rehnquist Court's recent Section 5
decisions is the enforcement model .....
26. Id. at 1949.
27. Congress cannot activate its Section 5 power at all unless it has "identified a history and
pattern of unconstitutional" state transgressions. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 (2001).
28. "There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end." Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
29. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. A host of scholarly responses to Garrett focused their critiques
on this requirement that Congress justify its actions with a "sufficient" documentary record. See,
e.g., A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's
New "On the Record" Constitutional Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328
(2001); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary
Analysis, 50 DuKE L.J. 1169 (2001); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral
Principles and Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. REv. 115 (2003).
30. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365.
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procedural restrictions on Congress. In Garrett the Court rejected, as a
procedural matter, categories of evidence that Congress had attempted to
use to vindicate Title I of the ADA as a Section 5 statute. The Court also
held that the evidence adduced by Congress to sustain Title I did not
establish what the Court would deem violations of the Constitution.
Even if Congress identifies widespread violations of judicially
ascertained rights, the remedial condition still allows the Court to prevent
Congress from using its Section 5 power to enact legislation that disguises
competing interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment under the mask of
a Section 5 remedy. Thus, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court
concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act exceeded
congressional Section 5 authority because its remedial requirements were
"disproportionate to any unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be
targeted by the Act" and hence had become "substantive" in nature.
31
While decisions from Boerne through Garrett only seemed to increase
the burden on Congress for Section 5 lawmaking, in 2003 the Court shed
new light on the Garrett-Boerne tests for appropriate equal protection
enforcement. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the
Court validated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) as Section 5
legislation even while claiming to preserve judicial supremacy.32 Faced
with a weak legislative record demonstrating states' unconstitutional family
leave policies and a remedy that' imposed the costs of family leave on
employers,33 the Hibbs Court introduced two new doctrinal rules to justify
its conclusion that the rights and remedial conditions were fulfilled. First,
the Court held that Congress could more easily demonstrate a pattern of
constitutional violations if the rights at stake were subjected to "a
heightened level of scrutiny":
34
Under our equal protection case law, discrimination on the basis of
[age or disability] .. passes muster if there is a rational basis for
doing so at a class-based level, even if it is probably not true that
those reasons are valid in the majority of cases....
... Because the standard for demonstrating the constitutionality
of a gender-based classification is more difficult to meet than our
31. 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
32. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
33. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword. Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 16 & n.68 (2003).
34. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 736,
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rational-basis test[,] .. it was easier for Congress to show a pattern
of state constitutional violations.35
The Court's heightened scrutiny of gender classifications proved dispositive
for fulfillment of the rights condition in Hibbs. In Garrett, by contrast, the
Court had concluded that the disability discrimination prohibited by Title I
of the ADA triggered only rational basis scrutiny, and consequently that
Congress would be held to a much higher standard in demonstrating a
pattern of constitutional violations.
Second, the Hibbs Court offered a more generous application of the
Boerne congruence-and-proportionality test for the remedial condition,
announcing that Congress's past efforts to enforce Section 1 guarantees
might affect a Section 5 law's proportionality. Defending the remedial form
of the FMLA, the Chief Justice concluded, "Congress again confronted a
'difficult and intractable proble[m],' where previous legislative attempts
had failed. Such problems may justify added prophylactic measures in
response." 36 The Boerne test already measured proportionality of "remedial
measures... in light of the evil presented," 37 but now the Hibbs Court
applied greater deference by measuring the law's remedial proportionality
in light of Congress's coordinate role in enforcement over time.
While a juricentric vision of the Section 5 power generated the
enforcement model and its tests, the Court has also invoked a distinct
federalism jurisprudence to invalidate Section 5 legislation in ways that
deeply threaten the national government's power to bind the states with
constitutional rights standards. Citing an Eleventh Amendment bar to
private suits against states, the Court has twice limited civil rights
enforcement by the national government. The Court invoked the Eleventh
Amendment to end congressional use of commerce authority to
constitutionally bind the states with antidiscrimination laws. Invalidating
Congress's abrogation of states' immunity to suit, in 1996 the Court
declared in Seminole Tribe v. Florida that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment
restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction., 38
Additionally, even after acknowledging Section 5 as a power for which
"Congress' authority to abrogate [the Eleventh Amendment bar] is
undisputed, ' 39 the Court nevertheless invoked the Eleventh Amendment to
35. Id. at 735-36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. Id. at 737 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
37. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
38. 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996); see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) ("[W]e
hold that the States retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.").
39. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.15.
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restrict otherwise legitimate Section 5 legislation. In Garrett, the Court
actually applied the rights condition for valid Section 5 legislation
according to the prescriptions of its Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
Further, even while holding that Title I exceeded Section 5 authorization,
the Court suggested its decision did not threaten the federal power to
enforce constitutional guarantees because "Title I of the ADA still
prescribes standards applicable to the States"40 through other enforcement
mechanisms that do not implicate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.4'
This attempted defense of the Court's attack on congressional power
reveals a key theme in the Court's recent expression of the enforcement
model. Reflecting this judicial framing, scholars have also conflated these
jurisprudential arenas, targeting their critiques of the Section 5 rulings at the
Justices composing the "Federalism Five. 42 Yet, as this Note will show, it
is the Court's separation-of-powers vision that ultimately drives its
enforcement model, not federalism values. At stake is the national
government's capacity to enforce constitutional rights. After analyzing the
shape of the enforcement model as applied by Lane in Section B, this Note
ultimately shows how Lane directly challenges the use of Eleventh
Amendment federalism principles to restrict the national government's
Section 5 power to establish constitutional rights standards binding on the
states.
B. Due Enforcement
Lane, a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Stevens, holds that Title II's
mandate of courthouse access "constitutes a valid exercise of Congress' § 5
authority to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. '43 Yet
40. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001).
41. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 ("We
have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the States to
surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been preserved to them by the original
Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits against nonconsenting States pursuant
to its § 5 enforcement power.").
42. See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, In(re)Dignity: The New Federalism in Perspective, 57
ARK. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (classifying this consistent majority in each of these decisions as Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas); see also R. Shep
Melnick, Both the Sword and the Purse: State Governments and Statutory Rights in the Rehnquist
Court (Aug. 30, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.bc.edu/schools/cas/
polisci/meta-elements/pdf/melnick/sword-and-the-purse.pdf. For illustrative critiques focusing on
federalism as a component of these Section 5 decisions, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING
THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES (2002); Sylvia A. Law, In
the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U.
CIN. L. REv. 367 (2002); and Todd B. Tatelman, Comment, Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs: The Eleventh Amendment in a States' Rights Era: Sword or Shield?, 52
CATH. U. L. REv. 683 (2003).
43. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004).
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despite this endorsement of congressional power, the majority unmistakably
affirmed the Court's claim to exclusive interpretive authority. This Section
explains how the Court analyzed Title II according to the conditions of the
enforcement model but deployed this framework in new ways based on
distinct features of Due Process Clause enforcement.
To identify the line separating valid enforcement from substantive
redefinition of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Lane opinion is organized
around the Garrett and Boerne tests of Section 5 authority. Lane confirms
that, first, the Garrett rights condition requires a "relevant history and
pattern of constitutional violations" 44 and, second, the Boerne remedial
condition demands that Section 5 legislation "exhibit[] a 'congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. 45
The Lane Court began by considering "the constitutional right or rights
that Congress sought to enforce when it enacted Title II.,,46 In Garrett, this
first step sufficed to invalidate Title I of the ADA, with Chief Justice
Rehnquist defining the constitutional right in question according to the
Court's standard of review in its equal protection precedent for disability,
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.47 Construing Cleburne to grant
only "minimum 'rational-basis' review" '48 of disability classifications,
Garrett made this standard of review itself a binding substantive framework
and thereby discounted much of the ample discrimination record amassed
by Congress in passing the ADA. 49 Thus, in the first step of the
enforcement model, the Garrett Court transformed rational basis review
into a doctrine of minimal scrutiny for state disability discrimination and
strict scrutiny of Congress's Section 5 laws. 50 As Justice Breyer explained,
44. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1987.
45. Id. at 1986 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
46. Id. at 1988.
47. 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding no rational basis for a special-use-permit requirement for
group homes for mentally retarded individuals). The Court articulated three tiers of scrutiny for
legislative classifications-rational basis scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Id. at
442-43 (finding that individuals classified as mentally retarded are not subject to heightened
scrutiny).
48. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001). But see Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 456
(Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Court
actually applied a more exacting standard than the mere rational basis analysis given to general
economic and social legislation).
49. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368, 372; see also id. at 377 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Congress
compiled a vast legislative record documenting massive, society-wide discrimination against
persons with disabilities." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
50. See Louis D. Bilionis, The New Scrutiny, 51 EMORY L.J. 481 (2002); Melissa Hart,
Conflating Scope of Right with Standard of Review: The Supreme Court's "Strict Scrutiny" of
Congressional Efforts To Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1091 (2001). For
a more extended discussion by a lower court before Garrett, see Kilcullen v. New York State
Department of Transportation, 33 F. Supp. 2d 133, 143 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) ("This Court concludes
that under Boerne, the boundaries of the right granted to persons with disabilities under the Equal
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"[I]t is difficult to understand why the Court, which applies 'minimum
"rational-basis" review' to statutes that burden persons with
disabilities, subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help those
same individuals.'
In contrast, Lane emancipates Title II from Garrett's application of the
rights condition by mobilizing the Due Process Clause guarantees not just
for people with disabilities but for all citizens: "Title II, like Title I, seeks to
enforce this prohibition on irrational disability discrimination. But it also
seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees ....
As a primary preserve of constitutional rights, access to the courthouse
spotlights the enforceable guarantee of fundamental rights for every citizen,
regardless of any comparative classifications that simultaneously hinder
exercise of these fundamental rights. The Court articulated each
constitutional guarantee without mentioning disability because the case
implicated Congress's power to enforce due process rights of courthouse
access for "criminal defendants," "civil litigants," and "members of the
public" alike,53 not just George Lane:
The Due Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, as applied to the States via the Fourteenth
Amendment, both guarantee to a criminal defendant such as
respondent Lane the "right tobe present at all stages of the trial
where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings."
Faretta v. California. The Due Process Clause also requires the
States to afford certain civil litigants a "meaningful opportunity to
be heard" by removing obstacles to their full participation in
judicial proceedings. Boddie v. Connecticut. We have held that the
Sixth Amendment guarantees to criminal defendants the right to
trial by a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community,
noting that the exclusion of "identifiable segments playing major
roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional
concept of jury trial." Taylor v. Louisiana. And, finally, we have
recognized that members of the public have a right of access to
criminal proceedings secured by the First Amendment. Press-
Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., County of Riverside.54
Protection Clause is defined by the level of judicial scrutiny applicable to claims alleging
discrimination on the basis of disability, i.e. the rational basis test.").
51. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 387-88 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
52. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1988 (2004).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1988 (citations omitted).
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Thus, instead of making Cleburne's equal protection ruling its analytic
anchor, Lane tests Title II's courthouse-access mandate according to
fundamental guarantees in the Court's Due Process Clause jurisprudence.
In its application of the rights condition, Lane affirms the Court's
interpretive exclusivity while validating Congress's due process
enforcement for the first time. To find the rights condition fulfilled, Lane
acknowledges courthouse-access guarantees as constitutionally binding-
according to the Court's vision of Section 1.55 In this respect, the passage
above underscores the enforcement model's core premise: "Congress does
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is."'56 For each
constitutional right of judicial access implicated in Title II's accessibility
requirement, Lane identifies a specific decision in which the Supreme Court
had already recognized that right as protected under the Due Process
Clause. Consequently, even as the Lane Court partially freed itself from
Garrett by reviewing enforcement of constitutional rights under the Due
Process Clause, the Court affirmed its core vision of the enforcement power
in which the Fourteenth Amendment-and the Constitution-remains
exclusively articulable by the judiciary.
At the same time, the Court sharply distinguished its evaluation of the
rights condition in Lane from its review in Garrett by replacing strict
scrutiny of Section 5 legislation with heightened scrutiny of the violations
Congress sought to redress through Title II of the ADA. This greater
deference in testing whether Congress had identified a pattern of states'
unconstitutional transgressions is driven by the Court's broad articulation of
fundamental rights in the Due Process Clause, "infringements of which are
subject to more searching judicial review": 57
[B]ecause the FMLA was targeted at sex-based classifications,
which are subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, it
was easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations than in Garrett or Kimel .... Title II is aimed at the
enforcement of a variety of basic rights. that call for a standard
of judicial review at least as searching, and in some cases more
searching, than the standard that applies to sex-based
classifications.58
55. Cf Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365, 368 (declaring that employment accommodations for people
with disabilities exceed the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause as interpreted by the
Court).
56. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
57. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1988.
58. Id. at 1992 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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By focusing on the Due Process Clause, where the Court's precedent
mandated heightened judicial scrutiny of violations, Justice Stevens fit the
Court's evidentiary review into the Hibbs-not the Garrett-application of
the enforcement model. With fundamental due process rights at stake,
Congress would be given greater leeway to demonstrate a pattern of
constitutional violations.
It bears observation that Lane's heightened judicial scrutiny under the
Due Process Clause differs from Hibbs's broad review of the FMLA record
under the Equal Protection Clause. The Hibbs Court's judicial presumption
made it "easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional
violations" satisfying the rights condition. 59 In contrast, heightened scrutiny
in Lane does not give rise to a presumed pattern of violations, but instead
applies a presumption of unconstitutionality to the states' exclusion of
people with disabilities that Congress documented with "statistical,
legislative, and anecdotal evidence., 60 Thus, although different from its
presumption for equal protection enforcement, the Court's heightened
scrutiny of states' conduct narrowed the scope of any acceptable exclusion
and thereby freed Lane's analysis of the ADA from Garrett.
The importance of this due-process-driven application of the rights
condition is clearly evident in the Court's conclusion that "Congress
enacted Title II against a backdrop of . systematic deprivations of
fundamental rights. 61 Justice Stevens directly mobilized Hibbs to reject the
Chief Justice's claim that Lane presents a "near-total lack of actual
constitutional violations in the congressional record . . . reminiscent of
Garrett.,62 Turning to the Chief Justice's own majority opinion in Hibbs for
support, Justice Stevens noted,
Just last Term in Hibbs, we approved the family-care leave
provision of the FMLA as valid § 5 legislation based primarily on
evidence of disparate provision of parenting leave, little of which
concerned unconstitutional state conduct.... [I]n any event, the
record of constitutional violations in [Lane] ... far exceeds the
record in Hibbs.63
As a result, the Lane Court concluded, the "sheer volume of evidence
demonstrat[es] the nature and extent of unconstitutional discrimination
against persons with disabilities in the provision of public services." 64 To
59. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003).
60. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992.
61. Id. at 1989.
62. Id. at 2002 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1991-92 (majority opinion).
64. Id. at 1991.
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emphasize its jurisprudential consistency, Lane even references findings in
Garrett, as the Garrett Court had rejected Title I's Section 5 validity by
noting "that the 'overwhelming majority' of... evidence related to 'the
provision of public services and public accommodations, which areas are
addressed in Titles II and III,' rather than Title I.,,61
Lane also deploys the Boerne remedial condition in upholding Title
II's courthouse-accessibility mandates. The Court endorsed Congress's
prohibition on the exclusion of people with disabilities according to its
own jurisprudential baseline for constitutional remediation, underscoring
the "well-established due process principle that, 'within the limits of
practicability, a State must afford to all individuals a meaningful
opportunity to be heard' in its courts," along with "a number of
affirmative obligations" for access to the judiciary. 66 Yet the Court also
looked beyond its own jurisprudence in providing practical meaning to
this due process mandate for the specific context of people with
disabilities. Lacking any contrary decision applying the due process
mandate to this setting, the Court endorsed Congress's remedial
conclusion that "failure to accommodate persons with disabilities will
often have the same practical effect as outright exclusion., 67 This crucial
recognition drives Title II's articulation of an affirmative duty to ensure
accessibility for people with disabilities. By moving beyond the limits of
the Court's equal protection vision for people with disabilities to instead
confront guarantees for all citizens in the Due Process Clause, Lane
deploys an enforcement model that still conditions approval on
congruence and proportionality in Section 5 remedies but that also accepts
more meaningful judicial-legislative dialogue about the shape of those
broad due process mandates for courthouse access.
Thus, Lane's application of the Garrett-Boerne tests affirms the core
principles and overall structure of the enforcement model, but it also
liberates Congress's enforcement power from the strict interpretive review
previously fatal in Section 5 decisions. The next two Parts examine the new
puzzles posed in Lane's scope of review for the rights and remedial
conditions, as well as the implications of this decision for future judicial
review of Section 5 challenges.
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II. THE JUDICIAL PRESERVE OF As-APPLIED ENFORCEMENT REVIEW
A controversial and puzzling feature of Lane was the Court's refusal to
review Title II as a whole and its decision to consider instead only the rights
to courthouse access raised by the particular facts of the case. This narrow
scope of review provoked criticism of Lane for "rais[ing] as many
questions as it answers. 68 The Lane majority's limitation of the decision to
only "the class of cases 'implicating the fundamental right of access to the
courts ' ' 69 marked a compromise by the four Justices who dissented from
previous Section 5 rulings, in order to secure Justice O'Connor's crucial
fifth vote.7° The prospect of an olive branch was palpable during Lane's
oral argument, when Justice Breyer sought to mobilize the potency of
courthouse exclusion to preclude the Garrett majority from reassembling to
invalidate Title II in its entirety: "[W]e're talking here [about using] the
statute [for] judicial or courthouse-related services, programs, or activities.
So I was seeing this as a kind of as-applied challenge, and if it's
constitutional in this area, maybe we leave the other areas for a later
time."71
Using this framework, the Lane Court narrowed Tennessee's
challenge-and the scope of the Court's holding-to Title II's validity only
insofar as it protected access to courts.7 This was the first time since
Boerne that a majority explicitly addressed the question of whether review
of Section 5 legislation should be directed to the application of a statute as
distinct from consideration of the statute's facial validity. I call this the
"scope of review" question. As Parts II and III demonstrate, the consensus
reached for Lane's scope of review forms the analytic linchpin in the
Court's vindication of both the judicial and legislative enforcement powers.
This Part shows that Lane's as-applied review of the enforcement of
multiple constitutional rights was consistent with previous Section 5
decisions and was driven by the juricentric logic of the rights condition
itself. Importantly, this Part also reveals that Lane's as-applied parsing of
Section 5 enforcement is not merely an exception for the compelling
access-to-courts fact pattern presented by George Lane and other
68. Sharmila Roy, Suits Against States: What To Know About the 11th Amendment, ARIZ.
ATT'Y, Oct. 2004, at 26.
69. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1994.
70. In crafting the majority opinion, Justice Stevens likely was influenced by the competing
imperatives of vindicating Congress's enforcement power and preserving Justice O'Connor's
support for a more limited decision validating the enforcement model, which may explain some
ambiguities left unresolved. See, e.g., infra notes 109-111 and accompanying text.
71. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Lane (No. 02-1667).
72. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992-93 ("Whatever might be said about Title II's other applications,
the question presented in this case is ... whether Congress had the power under § 5 to enforce the
constitutional right of access to the courts.").
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respondents. Rather, the rationale of this as-applied ruling binds future
judicial review of Title II for enforcement of other constitutional rights as
well.
A. Parsing Section 5 Enforcement
The Court's logic in upholding Title II as applied to courthouse access
is reasonably clear. Federal courts have traditionally declared a legislative
enactment unconstitutional in two ways: on its face, concluding it is
unconstitutional in all of its applications, or as applied to the circumstances
of a particular case.73 The Court has also recognized a special First
Amendment analysis that forbids certain forms of statutory overbreadth: A
statute can be facially unconstitutional even when it can be constitutionally
applied to a litigant if it has "too many" unconstitutional applications to
third parties not before the court.74 Because Title II's remedial mandate
reaches government conduct in many settings, from courthouses and voting
booths to prison facilities75 and "seating at state-owned hockey rinks,
' 76
Tennessee's challenge to Title II turned heavily on the statute's alleged
overbreadth. 7
Given the Court's view of facial invalidation as, "manifestly, strong
medicine.... employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort,
78
Lane's as-applied scope could be viewed as rather unremarkable. After all,
while an as-applied challenge only invites narrow review of a statute's
constitutionality, facial invalidation betrays a deep tension with the Article
III mandate that courts resolve specific cases or controversies and confront
constitutional questions only as a last resort.79 For a litigant to successfully
73. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 235,
236 (1994).
74. Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REv. 359, 369 (1998); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
610-15 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (concluding that state
prisons are "public entities" subject to the prescriptions of Title II).
76. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1992. During oral argument, Justice Scalia suggested that the reach of
the program-accessibility requirement even to state-owned hockey rinks illustrated the statute's
disproportionate, undifferentiated response to violations that do not implicate fundamental rights
guarantees, see, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, Lane (No. 02-1667), and hence remain
subject to the Cleburne rationality standard for discrimination, as construed in Garrett.
77. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 29-30, Lane (No. 02-1667) ("Title II targets ... an
unlimited array of subjects ranging from parking space availability at state museums and concert
seating priorities at state performing arts centers to recreational offerings at state parks and the
configuration of bathroom stalls at highway rest areas." (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
78. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.
79. Isserles, supra note 74, at 361; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 767 & n.20
(1982) ("The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied
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challenge the constitutionality of a law on its face, the Court has held that
"the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid.,80 Even so, disagreement has persisted
among the Justices regarding the proper settings in which each scope of
review should be deployed.8 '
The Rehnquist Court began its stringent scrutiny of Section 5
legislation in Boerne by analyzing Congress's authority for RFRA on its
face, declaring that the "judgment of the . . . Act's constitutionality is
reversed. 82 Invoking this facial review in Lane, Chief Justice Rehnquist
expressed "grave doubts" about the majority's as-applied methodology:
"Our § 5 precedents do not support this as-applied approach.... If we had
arbitrarily constricted the scope of the statutes to match the scope of a core
constitutional right, those cases might have come out differently. 8 3
In actuality, however, the Court had never addressed the required scope
of review under its enforcement model. From Boerne through Hibbs the
Court reviewed either the statute or the statutory title in toto-on five
different occasions-without a single discussion by the majorities about
whether an as-applied approach might be appropriate. Taking note of the
uncertainty about the proper scope of Section 5 challenges post-Boerne,
Richard Fallon concluded that "it is a mark of reigning confusion that at
least three interpretations of [the scope of] Florida Prepaid are reasonably
defensible.... [The Court] then needs to be more explicit about the nature
and intended effects of the tests that it employs . ,.. 4 In fact, Florida
Prepaid was the only Section 5 case where a dissenting Justice attempted to
"save" the statute by calling for as-applied analysis, but the lack of any
response in the majority opinion left the validity of this approach
uncertain.8 5 This Part demonstrates how Lane's as-applied scope of review
can be reconciled with the logic of the post-Boerne rulings.
may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally
to others in situations not before the Court.").
80. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
81. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party
Standing, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1321, 1322-23 (2000) (illustrating the sharp disagreement between
Justices Scalia and Stevens regarding application of the Salerno standard to anti-abortion statutes).
82. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
83. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
84. Fallon, supra note 81, at 1358-59.
85. For a critique of the Court's decision to construct a facial overbreadth standard in post-
Boerne cases "without any discussion of its merits or drawbacks," see Catherine Carroll, Note,
Section Five Overbreadth: The Facial Approach to Adjudicating Challenges Under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1026, 1030 (2003). See also Timothy J. Cahill
& Betsy Malloy, Overcoming the Obstacles of Garrett: An "As Applied" Saving Construction for
the ADA's Title I, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 133, 139-40 & n.34 (2004) (urging the Court to
decide Lane with some form of as-applied analysis to avoid facial invalidation but declining to
discuss how the rationale for this standard of review applies to any other Section 5 laws).
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The Court's Section 5 holdings in cases long before Boerne and as
recently as Garrett provide consistent support for Lane's limitation of the
scope of review. First, the Court has already deployed an as-applied
approach for review of legislative enforcement in the leading case cited by
the majority, United States v. Raines.86 Raines unambiguously established
the limited scope that the Court should impute to constitutional challenges
against Congress's enforcement power. The challenged law was the Civil
Rights Act of 1957, passed pursuant to Congress's Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement power: 87 "We think that under the rules we have stated, [the
district] court should then have gone no further and should have upheld the
Act as applied in the present action ... ,88 Discounting this clear
precedent, the Chief Justice argued in Lane that Raines was decided before
the Rehnquist Court's reconstruction of Section 5 review: "[T]he only
authority cited by the majority is Raines, a case decided long before we
enunciated the congruence-and-proportionality test.', 89 However, the force
of the Raines doctrine in shaping the scope of review for the Civil War
amendments has been repeatedly affirmed, even in decisions later affirmed
by Boerne itself. For instance, the seminal rulings in the 1960s Voting
Rights Act cases deployed a form of as-applied review. 90 This approach
continued into the 1970s with particular clarity in Griffin v. Breckenridge,
where the Court again relied on Raines:
Consequently, we need not find the language of § 1985(3) now
before us constitutional in all its possible applications in order to
86. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
87. The enforcement power in "Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is virtually identical to
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment," Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001)
(Rehnquist, C.J.), and these enforcement powers have "always been treated as coextensive," City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
88. Raines, 362 U.S. at 24-26. For a classic illustration of this judicial reasoning outside the
Section 5 context, see Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-
20 (1912) ("[T]his court must deal with the case in hand and not with imaginary ones. It suffices,
therefore, to hold that, as applied to cases like the present, the statute is valid. How the state court
may apply it to other cases, whether its general words may be treated as more or less restrained,
and how far parts of it may be sustained if others fail are matters upon which we need not
speculate now.").
89. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation
omitted).
90. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645 n.3, 643-45 (1966) (noting that because
appellees attacked the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act for enabling
thousands of Puerto Rican citizens to vote in violation of state law, the facts of the case defined
the "limitation on appellees' challenge to § 4(e), and thus on the scope of our inquiry"); South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 317 (1966) ("[W]e find that South Carolina's attack on
§§ 11 and 12(a)-(c) is premature. No person has yet been subjected to, or even threatened with,
the criminal sanctions which these sections of the Act authorize. United States v. Raines.
Consequently, the only sections of the Act to be reviewed at this time are §§ 4(a)-(d), 5, [and]
6(b) .... (citation omitted)).
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uphold its facial constitutionality and its application to the
complaint in this case.
... Our inquiry, therefore, need go only to identifying a source
of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged by
the complaint in this case.
91
Even after Boerne, Garrett provides the most relevant case study for
the consistency of as-applied versus facial constructions, because this is the
only recent case where the majority addressed a form of the scope-of-
review question. In light of his vigorous rejection of Lane's limited scope, it
is instructive to consider how Chief Justice Rehnquist himself narrowed the
scope of the challenge in Garrett:
We are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title
II... is appropriate legislation under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment .... To the extent the Court granted certiorari on the
question whether respondents may sue their state employers for
damages under Title II of the ADA, that portion of the writ is
dismissed as improvidently granted. 
92
Although the Chief Justice hinged this distinction on Title II's "somewhat
different remedial provisions" from Title I,93 this nevertheless reflected an
overt presumption of severability where none had previously been
exercised by the Rehnquist Court since Boerne.94 Thus, just as the Garrett
Court restricted its scope of review after accepting Titles I and II, the Lane
91. 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971) (emphasis added) (reviewing the legislative enforcement power
under the Thirteenth Amendment). Like the Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5 and the Fifteenth
Amendment's Section 2, the Thirteenth Amendment's Section 2 grants Congress enforcement
power.
92. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 n.1 (2001) (citation omitted). The Chief Justice
asserted this limitation to the scope of statutory review because it was not clear whether Title II
provided any legal remedy for the employment discrimination in the Garrett fact pattern. Id.
93. Id.
94. The Court did not specify in Lane how such a severability presumption attaches to an as-
applied scope of review after a Garrett-Boerne invalidation of the Section 5 law. Scholarship on
severability has long noted that '[w]hen particular words or sections of a statute are
unconstitutional, a court may excise them from the law," but "[w]hen statutory language is too
broad, .... there is nothing to be severed." Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses
in the Supreme Court, 51 HARV. L. REv. 76, 82 (1937). Were the Court to conclude from the
Garrett-Boerne tests that an application before the Court did not present a valid exercise of the
Section 5 power, the way it could consistently "save" or "cure" the statute while invalidating the
application would likely be to "construe the language employed as limited to its constitutional
applications," id.; see also Dorf, supra note 74. In an alternative severability remedy, the Court
might excise the language from a statutory provision or regulation authorizing an unconstitutional
application. For an illustration of the latter severability remedy of excising specific provisions to
save the constitutionality of a statute, see United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-68 (2005)
(majority opinion of Breyer, J.).
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Court mirrored this shift to a limited scope within Title II. The methodology
used to determine just how much the Court must limit its scope will be
described in the following Section, but what Garrett clearly demonstrates is
that the enforcement model had already been applied without facial analysis
of the ADA in its entirety.
B. Conditioning As-Applied Section 5 Review
The previous Section demonstrated how earlier Section 5 rulings
buttressed the Lane Court's decision to deploy some limitation on its scope
of review. However, only in Lane does the Court provide an explicit
discussion of the scope of review required by the enforcement model. As
this Section reveals, Lane carefully navigates between the Scylla of facial
determinations that might raise the specter of Title II's overbreadth and the
Charybdis of an as-applied methodology that turns only on the facts of each
plaintiffs case and would be inconsistent with Garrett itself. The Court
negotiated this middle ground by unveiling an as-applied methodology
driven by the logic of the enforcement model's rights condition.
At the heart of Lane's as-applied review is the Court's juricentric vision
of the Fourteenth Amendment embodied in the enforcement model's rights
condition. The Court preserved its role as "the ultimate expositor of the
constitutional text"95 by deploying an as-applied review of Title II based on
the four due-process-protected rights that the majority identified as
implicated by citizens' courthouse exclusion. The Chief Justice criticized
this as-applied approach as an effort to "rig the congruence-and-
proportionality test by artificially constricting the scope of the statute to
closely mirror a recognized constitutional right. 96 However, this critique
fails to acknowledge the extent to which it was the Lane Court's predicate
identification of the specific constitutional rights at issue that ultimately
drove its constricted scope of review. Lane affirmed explicitly, for the first
time post-Boerne, that the congruence and proportionality of a Section 5
statute must be reviewed within the scope of the judicially cognizable
constitutional rights implicated in the instant case in order to evaluate how
their specific, systematic deprivation was documented and remedied by
Congress. It is this central premise of the enforcement model-the
juricentric review of a Section 5 law-that underpins Lane's as-applied
holding.
Interestingly, only a limited number of the sources Lane cites to satisfy
the rights condition were actually presented in Congress as evidence of
95. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 n.7 (2000).
96. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 2005 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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disabled people's exclusion from the judicial system. Instead, much of
Lane's evidence was testimony from disabled Americans collected over
several years by the congressionally charged Task Force on the Rights and
Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities.97 Garrett had rejected this
evidence because it was "submitted not directly to Congress but to the Task
Force. 98 In stark contrast, Lane validates that same "appointed task force"
to illustrate disabled people's undeniable exclusion from the courthouse.99
Further, Lane does not purport to' prove that these "numerous examples of
the exclusion of persons with disabilities from state judicial services and
programs" were necessarily unconstitutional deprivations.100 Lane also cites
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission's finding that "76% of public services
and programs housed in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to and
unusable by persons with disabilities."'' 01 Yet once again, Lane makes no
effort to claim that this evidence of exclusion from public buildings
sufficed to establish unconstitutional transgressions. To be sure, Lane
explicitly asserts that the record was sufficient for the rights condition
because of the "sheer volume of evidence demonstrating the nature and
extent of unconstitutional discrimination against persons with disabilities in
the provision of public services."'' 0 2 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens validated
this "sheer volume" of evidence as relevant for the rights condition even as
Garrett dismissed much of this same evidence as "'unexamined, anecdotal
accounts. ,,103
Why was this evidence sufficient for the as-applied rights condition?
The Court's prior use of heightened scrutiny underpinned this conclusion.
Compared to Hibbs, Lane deploys "a standard of judicial review at least as
searching, and in some cases more searching.' 0 4 This meant the Lane
Court could more easily presume that the widespread exclusion of people
with disabilities, recorded in Congress's statistical, legislative, and
anecdotal evidence, failed to meet the compelling-interest standard
justifying deprivation of due process rights. As a result, even though the as-
applied scope limited the focus of evidence to the question of courthouse
97. The task force held more than sixty public forums, attended by 30,000 people from across
the United States. For an extensive list of the fact-finding hearings conducted during the three-
year period in which the ADA was under consideration by Congress, see Garrett, 531 U.S. at 389
app. A (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id. at 391 app. C (listing the hundreds of discrimination
submissions that would have violated Title II, all catalogued by the task force).
98. Id. at 370.
99. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1999 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he majority today cites the same congressional task force evidence we rejected in
Garrett.").
100. Id. at 1991 (majority opinion).
101. Id. at 1990.
102. Id. at 1991 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 2000 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Garrett, 531 U.S. at 370).
104. Id. at 1992 (majority opinion).
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access, the Lane Court was able to affirm that Congress's exercise of power
passed the rights condition based on a documented pattern of
unconstitutional exclusion from the courthouse that "far exceed[ed] the
record in Hibbs."
105
Lane's as-applied methodology differs critically from a purely fact-
based as-applied ruling. In testing the rights condition, the Lane Court did
not limit its finding to the particular facts presented by George Lane or
others. That is because Congress's power to pass a Section 5 law hinges not
on the facts of a case, but rather on the constitutional right or rights at stake.
The Lane Court underscored the juricentric, nonfactual application of the
rights condition by making reference to Hibbs, where the Court upheld the
FMLA "even though there was no suggestion that the [Nevada] leave
policy was adopted or applied with a discriminatory purpose that would
render it unconstitutional under... Feeney."
' 0 6
Were the Lane Court to have used an even narrower as-applied
approach based on the facts of the case, then the logic of the enforcement
model and such rulings as Florida Prepaid and Garrett would have been
undermined. In those rulings, the Court refused to avoid facially
invalidating Section 5 legislation by considering whether the circumstances
of the particular plaintiff before the Court actually satisfied the rights
condition. The Florida Prepaid Court invalidated the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act on its face, even though
respondent College Savings Bank invoked that Section 5 legislation
according to facts that comported precisely with the Court's own vision of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, such a fact-based review was the as-
applied cure Justice Stevens suggested to no avail in dissent:
Respondent College Savings Bank has alleged that petitioner's
[patent] infringement was willful. The question presented by this
case, then, is whether the Patent Remedy Act... may be applied to
willful infringement.
... [The Court's] negative answer to that question has nothing
to do with the facts of this case.0 7
Similarly, Garrett does not examine the facts of the case to determine
whether respondent Patricia Garrett was subjected to irrational
discrimination. If the Garrett Court had applied such a fact-driven as-
applied ruling, Patricia Garrett might have succeeded with a damages suit
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1986.
107. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 653-54
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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against Alabama by showing the discrimination against her violated the
Equal Protection Clause and therefore sufficed to meet the rights condition.
But Garrett does not permit this kind of fact-based as-applied review.' 
08
The contrast with Lane's as-applied approach is clear. Lane's as-
applied validation does not flow from the specific facts of the case, which
might have limited Lane to binding only future cases implicating the
fundamental right of a criminal defendant to courtroom access or to attend
his own criminal proceedings. Rather, Lane vindicates Title II as valid
enforcement of the class of any cases implicating courthouse-access rights.
As the Court's first decision upholding the enforcement of multiple
constitutional rights, Lane sheds fresh light on exactly how the operation of
the rights condition must be understood for the due process and equal
protection guarantees.
It bears emphasizing that the rights-centered structure of Lane's as-
applied inquiry binds the courts' future review of Fourteenth Amendment
Section 1 enforcement in important ways that transcend the multiplicity of
guarantees at stake in the case. The Lane Court's finding of sufficient rights
violations did not formally extend to all fundamental rights protected under
the Due Process Clause, but rather only reached those guarantees
implicated in courthouse access. Reflecting this structure, even judicial
review of a single Section 1 provision's enforcement is critically informed
by the rights-centered nature of the as-applied inquiry.
For instance, we might consider future challenges to Title II's equal
protection enforcement, where the right at stake remains the single Section
1 provision whose enforcement was reviewed in Garrett. Lane's as-applied
methodology shows how the courts might measure the rights condition
differently from Garrett, without overruling it. While Title I targets
discrimination by states as employers under the Equal Protection Clause,
Title II prohibits disability discrimination by state governments acting in
their capacities as sovereigns. 0 9 Where states act in their capacities as
108. The First and Second Circuits have deployed such an alternative as-applied
methodology to examine whether the facts of the case present a judicially cognizable
constitutional violation. Evaluating Title 1I's equal protection enforcement after Garrett, the
Second Circuit upheld Title II as applied to cases where states' treatment of people with
disabilities "was motivated by either discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability." Garcia v.
S.U.N.Y. Health Scis. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2001). The First Circuit also upheld Title II, "at
least as that Title is applied to cases in which a court identifies a constitutional violation by the
state." Kiman v. N.H. Dep't of Corr., 301 F.3d 13, 24 (1st Cir.), vacated in part, 311 F.3d 439 (1st
Cir. 2002) (en banc).
109. The Court has ruled that "'[t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as
effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively subordinate interest when it
acts as sovereign to a significant one when it acts as employer."' Bd. of County Comm'rs v.
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 676 (1996) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (plurality opinion)). In the Fourth Amendment context as
well, the Court has recognized the special interest of "public employers... in ensuring that the
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sovereigns, providing governmental programs and services to citizens, the
administrative efficiency justifications accepted in Garrett to justify
disability discrimination might be construed by courts to run afoul of the
rational basis standard Cleburne deployed to strike down the City of
Cleburne's discriminatory zoning ordinances as unconstitutionally
irrational.' 0 To be sure, this would still depend on the Court's rational basis
jurisprudence for state conduct governed under Title II, a matter requiring
separate scholarly examination."' 1 For this Note's purposes, it simply bears
observation that Lane's rights-centered as-applied inquiry should also shape
courts' future vindication of the rights condition in Title II even for a
challenge to "only" equal protection enforcement.
Lane has been criticized as introducing "further uncertainty into an
already muddy test"'12 because the scope of review is "shrouded in
uncertainty and appears hopelessly malleable, sounding the alarms of
judicial lawmaking."'1 13 Yet this critique bears less on the unique analytic
structure of Lane than on the "alarms of judicial lawmaking" sounded for
years in response to every post-Boerne decision restricting legislative
power. Lane's specific application of the rights condition represents a
pointedly modest exercise of the juricentric review framework that the
Court had deployed repeatedly to invalidate Section 5 legislation. In fact,
Lane provides new clarity about the analytic operation of the rights
condition and, in relief, the distinct considerations driving the Court's
application of the remedial condition discussed in Part III. Indeed, this Note
demonstrates how Lane illuminates the Court's application of Section 5
review conditions. It shows the centrality of specific constitutional
guarantees for how courts must apply the rights condition, which is
consistent with prior Section 5 rulings and has binding implications for
judicial review of future challenges to Title II's enforcement of other
constitutional rights.
work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner," an interest that otherwise is
subordinate to the constitutional right of citizens against certain forms of search and seizure.
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987).
110. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) ("The short of it is
that requiring the permit in this case appears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the
mentally retarded .... ").
111. Some scholars and courts have gone further. They suggest that, precisely because Title
II enforces both equal protection and due process rights, the Court should deploy its Garrett and
Boerne tests with the heightened scrutiny that vindicated the FMLA in Hibbs. As one judge
argued, "The fact that Title II implicates constitutional violations in areas ranging from education
to voting also suggests that heightened judicial scrutiny under both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses is appropriate." Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, 276
F.3d 808, 820 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Moore, J., concurring).
112. The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Leading Cases, 118 HARV. L. REV. 258, 268 (2004).
113. /d. at 267.
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An alternative account might interpret Lane's narrow holding less as a
change in the Court's Section 5 approach and more as a product of Justice
O'Connor's commitment to "decisional minimalism," a judicial philosophy
that leaves maximum flexibility for future decisions by limiting the burden
of a particular ruling. 1 4 However, speculation about Justice O'Connor's
motivation does not limit the implications of Lane's as-applied
methodology, which extend far beyond the compelling fact pattern of this
case. Moreover, Lane undoubtedly represents a marked shift from the facial
review deployed in every other post-Boerne decision, where Justice
O'Connor had always been in the majority. Even further, the analytic
structure of Lane's scope of review is critically distinguishable from a
merely fact-based as-applied inquiry that would provide the narrowest
ground of precedent but would be inconsistent with prior Section 5 rulings.
As a result, whether one interprets Lane to reflect the Court's interpretive
exclusivity or some commitment to decisional minimalism, this Note
confirms the centrality of each enforced constitutional guarantee for the
Court's application of the rights condition.
Thus, the as-applied scope of Lane's Section 5 review is ultimately
driven by the juricentric heartbeat of the Court's enforcement model, not by
any specific fact pattern. To conclude this Part, I show how Lane's as-
applied methodology offers a window into future courts' review of other
fundamental rights enforcement beyond the access-to-courts context.
C. A Template for Fundamental Rights Enforcement
Even as the Lane Court confined its Title II validation according to the
four constitutional rights implicated in courthouse access, the Court also
outlined fundamental rights deprivations beyond the courthouse context.
The Court recognized that, according to its own jurisprudence, Title II "also
seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitutional guarantees.", 1" 5 These
include the right to petition government, the right to vote, the right to humane
conditions of confinement, the right to be secure in one's person against
unreasonable search and seizure, and the right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. Importantly, these fundamental rights are all enshrined
either directly or by incorporation in the Due Process Clause and are thus
binding on states' relationships with their citizens.' 16 As a result, the
114. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4 (1999).
115. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1988 (2004).
116. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (concluding that the Bill of Rights
guarantees incorporated through the Due Process Clause are enforceable by Congress under
Section 5).
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majority's explanation of how systematic violations of fundamental
guarantees satisfy the rights condition provides a crucial template that
should firmly vindicate Title II as valid Section 5 enforcement of a broad
array of constitutional rights recognized in the Court's own due process
jurisprudence.
The structure of Lane's validation of the rights condition reveals the
opinion's evidentiary template for enforcement of these other fundamental
rights. For courthouse access, Justice Stevens's evidentiary review began
without reference to documentation by Congress. Instead, he pointed
directly to "laws that remain on the books" implicating the unconstitutional
judicial exclusion of disabled people, such as state codes in Michigan and
Tennessee, respectively, that banned the "infirm or decrepit" or the
"mentally and physically disabled" from ever serving as jurors. 1 7 Stevens
underscored the deep tension between these laws and the recognized
constitutional prohibition against "excluding identifiable segments" from
jury service. 118 In addition, Stevens mobilized the very evidentiary source
called for in Garrett and deployed in Hibbs-a review of the judiciary's
own chronicle of state constitutional violations. In Garrett, O'Connor and
Kennedy joined in concurrence to suggest this approach:
If the States had been transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment by
their mistreatment or lack of concern for those with impairments,
one would have expected to find in decisions of the courts of the
States and also the courts of the United States extensive litigation
and discussion of the constitutional violations. 19
In Hibbs, Rehnquist imported this judicial documentation into the
majority's evidentiary repertoire: "The history of the many state laws
limiting women's employment opportunities is chronicled in-and, until
relatively recently, was sanctioned by-this Court's own opinions."120 Lane
confers even greater weight on the judicial chronicle of rights violations,
pointedly noting that "this Court's cases... have identified unconstitutional
treatment of disabled persons by state agencies in a variety of settings." 
121
Lane confirms that "[t]he decisions of other courts ... also demonstrate a
pattern of unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice.' 122
Thus, responding to the evidentiary call for "litigation and [judicial]
117. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
119. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375-76 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003).
121. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989.
122. Id. at 1989-90.
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discussion of the constitutional violations,' ' 23 Justice Stevens included
direct citation to nine cases illustrating the breadth of the forms of judicial
exclusion historically faced by people with disabilities.
124
Lane shows precisely how this evidentiary approach may similarly
satisfy the rights condition for other constitutional guarantees. Combining
judicial documentation with direct citations to exclusionary state laws, Lane
provides an extensive catalogue of state violations of a vast array of
fundamental rights, not merely of the four courthouse-related access
guarantees. The Court cited disabled people's exclusion by states that
"'categorically disqualified "idiots" from voting, without regard to
individual capacity.' ' 125 Justice Stevens's note of disabled people's
categorical exclusions from marriage also mirrors his evidentiary
demonstration of their exclusion from jury service. 126 The overt exclusion
of people with disabilities is forcefully presented through Lane's citation to
state laws such as those "forbidding the issuance of a marriage license to
imbecile[s]. ' ',27 Further, Lane acknowledges additional unconstitutional
deprivations outside the courthouse context by citing the Supreme Court's
own documentation of disabled people's "unjustified commitment [and] the
abuse and neglect of persons committed to state mental hospitals,"'' 28 all
reflecting the states' "systematic deprivations of fundamental rights."' 129
Enumerating each of these "other basic constitutional guarantees"' 130
123. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
124. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1990n.14.
125. Id. at 1989 (quoting City ofClebune v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 464 & n.14
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
126. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989 n.8. State laws prohibiting marriage on the ground of disability
extended from mental to physical disabilities, even declaring a marriage voidable "if either party
to a marriage be incapable from physical causes of entering into the marriage state." MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 48-104 (Smith 1947). Even epilepsy was targeted in more than seventeen states as
an explicit basis for denying an individual the fundamental right to marry. Underscoring the
potency of this evidence, Justice Stevens provided direct quotations from such statutory codes
declaring illegal the marriage of "an idiot or of a person adjudged to be lunatic" and
"criminalizing the marriage of persons with mental disabilities." Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989 n.8
(internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989 n.8 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. at 1989. In landmark cases, courts have condemned both the conditions at institutions
for the developmentally disabled as cruel and unusual and the prolonged tenure faced by each
individual as violating the right to live in one's community. In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the
Supreme Court directly rejected the lifelong incarceration of people simply because of a
disability:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's locking a person up
against his will and keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement.
In short, a state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous
individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends.
422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
129. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1989.
130. Id. at 1988.
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protected by Title II, Lane invokes the extensive history of deprivation
documented in Congress's review of disabled people's experience. This
expansive history of fundamental rights violations is all cited in Lane
alongside the judicial record and state laws evincing a pattern of
"unconstitutional treatment in the administration of justice."'13'
Lane's discussion of this record of systematic fundamental rights
deprivations should not obscure the still-confined scope of the challenge to
the "particular services at issue in this case." 132 Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens presented this record of systematic fundamental rights deprivations
according to the same analytic structure and in the same discussion showing
how the fights condition is satisfied for enforcement of disabled citizens'
courthouse-access guarantees. The common thread linking Lane's
evidentiary survey of this array of fundamental rights is clear. These fights
all provide constitutional baselines governing the relationships between
states and their citizens according to the Due Process Clause. Thus, even in
Lane's as-applied ruling, the majority's evidentiary review provides a
template for how future litigation challenging the Section 5 enforcement of
other fundamental rights may be processed by courts measuring the rights
condition.
The Lane Court's conclusion that Title II met the burden of the rights
condition sheds substantial new light both on the juricentric nature of the
as-applied methodology and on how the rights condition might be measured
in future challenges to Title II's enforcement of other constitutional rights.
Part III engages a second puzzle that Lane reveals in the enforcement
model: distinguishing the narrow evidentiary base for the as-applied rights
condition from the sweeping evidence considered for the remedial
condition. This Part will show how Lane resolves this puzzle by changing
application of the remedial condition to grant Congress more expansive
Section 5 authority.
III. EMANCIPATING CONGRESSIONAL REMEDIATION
If Lane had evaluated the remedial condition with the same as-applied
methodology it deployed for the rights condition, such a narrow review
would have had significant implications for the Boerne test by excluding
evidence not tightly tied to the Court's vision of the Section 1 rights at
stake. Title II's proportionality, then, would only be informed by evidence
131. Id. at 1990.
132. Id.
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relating to the courthouse-access question in this case, "not... to hockey
rinks, or even to voting booths."
1 33
On the contrary, however, Lane vindicates the proportionality of the
Title II remedy based on a broad swath of evidence extending far beyond
the Section 1 rights at stake in courthouse access. Further, the accessibility
obligations imposed in the remedy cast Title II as "so-called prophylactic
legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to
prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct."' 34 Herein lies Lane's second
major puzzle: How is the remedial condition's use of a sweeping
evidentiary base for Title II's remedy compatible with the analytic
constraints imposed by the decision's as-applied methodology? What does
the evidence mobilized in Lane suggest about the Court's larger view of the
enforcement power? Even though Lane's as-applied methodology constricts
the scope of evidence relevant to establishing violations under the rights
condition, Lane's application of the remedial condition demonstrates the
Court's willingness to accept sweeping evidence of "the evil presented
' 1 35
as relevant to Congress's pragmatic justification for Title II's remedial
proportionality.
A. Separating Support for Rights and Remedies
The Rehnquist Court's Section 5 jurisprudence betrays an abiding
uncertainty about the theoretical and historical scope of Congress's
prophylactic power to remedy conditions that do not themselves constitute a
violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 136 On the one hand,
the Court has repeatedly said that "Congress 'is not confined to... merely
parrot[ing] the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 1 37 On the
other hand, the Court has repeatedly condemned Congress for failing to
satisfy the remedial condition because Section 5 legislation was not
congruent and proportional to the violations it sought to remedy.' 38 Even
when the Court upheld Congress's Section 5 prophylaxis in Hibbs, Chief
Justice Rehnquist took account of an expansive evidentiary base for the
remedial condition only after tying this broad evidence tightly to the
133. Id. at 1993.
134. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727-28 (2003) (emphasis added).
135. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
136. For illustrative evaluations of the Court's conception of the prophylactic scope of
Section 5, see Post & Siegel, supra note 25, at 1949; Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5
Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 673 (2001); and Tracy A. Thomas, The
Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad Injunctive
Relief, 52 BuFF. L. REV. 301, 337 (2004).
137. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737 (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)).
138. See supra note 5.
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Section 1 prohibition of sex discrimination. Each new source of evidence
marshaled in Hibbs for the proportionality test-from the Court's
complicity in sanctioning discrimination' 39 to the failure of past remedial
efforts by Congress 14° -was used to shed light on an "evil presented" that
was closely situated to the Section 1 right of sex discrimination that the
FMLA was presumably trying to remedy.' 4' Hibbs, accordingly, provided
only a limited glimpse at the Court's potential vindication of congressional
prophylaxis.
Lane's review of the Title II accessibility remedy directly implicates
the scope of Congress's power to prevent and deter future violations by
proscribing even conduct the Court might deem constitutional. In
prohibiting the exclusion of people with disabilities from all public
services, programs or activities, Title II's duty of accommodation requires
states to make reasonable modifications by removing architectural and
other barriers to accessibility. 142 Applied to the courthouse, Title II thus
binds all states with an accommodation duty that actively deters the future
unconstitutional exclusion of people with disabilities from courthouses.
Despite congressional limitations on the scope of the modification
mandate, 143 the Court before Lane had never interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to require such a duty of accommodation to avoid the
unconstitutional exclusion of people with disabilities. Consequently, even
though the Court had recognized Congress's "authority both to remedy and
deter" violations, "including [conduct] not itself forbidden by the
Amendment's text,'144 the Garrett Court invalidated a similar remedy in
Title I: "[T]he accommodation duty far exceeds what is constitutionally
required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternative responses that
would be reasonable but would fall short of imposing an 'undue burden'
upon the employer.0 45 As Part I noted, the accommodation duty rejected in
Garrett is distinguishable from the duty in Lane according to the Court's
judicial access jurisprudence, which recognizes a "well-established due
process principle" of "meaningful" access and "affirmative obligations."
146
However, the Court had never articulated the scope of an access guarantee
for people with disabilities. This forms a key element in Rehnquist's
dissent:
139. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 729.
140. Id. at 737.
141. See also supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 35.151 (2004) (specifying the regulations
implementing Title 1I's mandate for program accessibility).
143. See infra notes 164-169 and accompanying text.
144. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
145. Id. at 372.
146. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1994 (2004).
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We have never held that a person has a constitutional right to make
his way into a courtroom without any external assistance. Indeed,
the fact that the State may need to assist an individual to attend a
hearing has no bearing on whether the individual successfully
exercises his due process right to be present at the proceeding. 147
On this basis, the Chief Justice used the remedial condition to criticize Title
II for exceeding the Court's previous view of the Fourteenth Amendment:
"[E]ven in the courthouse-access context, Title II requires substantially
more than the Due Process Clause. 148 Similarly, during oral argument
Justice Scalia questioned the proportionality of Title II's remedial duty even
if failure to accommodate might implicate deprivation of fundamental
rights: "He has a constitutional right for the state to provide him the means
of being present at his trial. Now, does the means have to be an elevator or
could it be someone assisting up the stairs? . . . [I]t may be less
dignified .. , but is it a constitutional violation . . . ?,,149 Rejecting this
narrow application of the remedial condition, Lane marks the first decision
in which the Court endorsed an accommodation duty as a "reasonable
prophylactic measure"' 50 constitutionally binding the states.
Lane's review of a Section 5 law enforcing multiple constitutional
rights subject to varying degrees of judicial scrutiny illuminates the
distinction between the evidence necessary to satisfy the rights condition
and the evidence necessary to satisfy the remedial condition. Lane
vindicates the congruence and proportionality of Title II on the basis of
evidence that goes far beyond the mere question of whether people with
disabilities have been denied access to courthouses. Recognizing the
147. Id. at 2002 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 2006.
149. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Lane (No. 02-1667). In a break with his prior
positions on Section 5, Justice Scalia wrote a separate dissent criticizing the Court's post-Boerne
review of Section 5 laws altogether:
Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress's taskmaster. Under it, the courts
(and ultimately this Court) must regularly check Congress's homework to make sure
that it has identified sufficient constitutional violations to make its remedy congruent
and proportional. As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere to
constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a coequal branch of
Government. And when conflict is unavoidable, we should not come to do battle with
the United States Congress armed only with a test ("congruence and proportionality")
that has no demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively be
shown to have been met or failed.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2009 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Despite this critique suggesting the potential for
greater deference to the constitutional authority of Congress, Justice Scalia actually proposed a
less deferential standard for the remedial condition. In criticizing the Court's validation of Title II
as prophylactic legislation, Scalia concluded, "[W]hat § 5 does not authorize is so-called
'prophylactic' measures, prohibiting primary conduct that is itself not forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 2010.
150. Id. at 1994 (majority opinion).
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challenge of providing legislative relief for "[d]ifficult and intractable
problems [that] often require powerful remedies," 15 ' Lane adopts a
generous evidentiary standard for Title II under the remedial condition that
stands in marked contrast to the narrow scope of review-for only
courthouse-access violations-under the rights condition.
The key doctrinal device justifying Lane's broad evidentiary standard is
the Court's pragmatic recognition of Congress's extensive past efforts to
combat the exclusion of people with disabilities: "[T]he shortcomings of
previous legislative responses . . [to] this difficult and intractable
proble[m] warranted added prophylactic measures in response.' 52 Just as
Hibbs considered legislation like the Pregnancy Discrimination Act that
may have implicated conduct beyond that proscribed by the Court's Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence, so too does Lane consider evidence of
Congress's failed remediation efforts that extends far beyond the
courthouse-access deprivation that is the focus of the rights condition. Thus,
the scope of the Lane Court's evaluation of the remedial condition was
based on the pervasiveness of disability discrimination--even
discrimination that did not involve fundamental rights-because such
discrimination "persisted despite several federal and state legislative efforts
to address it." 1
53
Lane repeatedly cites with approval Justice Breyer's Garrett dissent,
which chronicles accounts of discrimination to demonstrate the "pattern of
disability discrimination [that] persisted" over decades in "hundreds of
examples of unequal treatment of persons with disabilities."'' 54 We can best
understand this breathtakingly expansive use of evidence by reference to
Lane's consideration of the remedial condition. Lane chronicles
deprivations that offer compelling evidence of far-reaching and deeply
entrenched evils, which justify Congress's use of a prophylactic remedy to
end the exclusion of people with disabilities from the administration of
justice. This use of evidence is especially striking given the Court's
circumscribed scrutiny of only the "question presented in this case.' '155
B. Codifying a Common Evidentiary Base for Section 5 Remedies
Lane's sweeping validation of Title 1I's remedial proportionality has
critical implications for judicial review of future challenges to Congress's
equal protection and fundamental rights enforcement. Prior to Lane, the
151. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000).
152. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1990.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1993.
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Court had repeatedly declared that Section 5 statutes failed the remedial
condition after evaluating their proportionality only on the basis of a narrow
evidentiary record of constitutional violations primarily relevant to the
rights condition. Yet, because the Court framed Title II as Congress's
prophylactic effort justified by the expansive history of "legislative efforts
to address"' 156 discrimination against people with disabilities, Lane formally
chronicles the broader commonplace exclusions that kept people with
disabilities outside of the institutions of state government where they could
exercise their rights and claim citizenship in their communities. Concurring
in Lane, Justice Souter even condemned the Court's own complicity in the
systematic deprivation of the constitutional rights of people with
disabilities:
[T]he judiciary itself has endorsed the basis for some of the very
discrimination subject to congressional remedy under § 5. Buck v.
Bell was not grudging in sustaining the constitutionality of the
once-pervasive practice of involuntarily sterilizing those with
mental disabilities.... One administrative action [excluding people
with disabilities] was judicially sustained in part as a justified
precaution against the very sight of a child with cerebral palsy, lest
he "produc[e] a depressing and nauseating effect" upon others. 157
Consequently, the expansive evidentiary base Lane incorporates into the
congruence-and-proportionality test provides a common foundation for
future as-applied challenges to either fundamental rights or equal protection
enforcement in Title II.
Significantly, Lane even applies its sweeping vindication of Section 5
prophylactic power under the remedial condition to congressional efforts to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause. The Lane Court assessed the evidence
relevant for congruence and proportionality in a highly practical way, and it
seized the occasion to spell out some of the implications of this approach
for Section 5 legislation seeking to vindicate Section I's equality guarantee:
"When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional
discrimination, § 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation
proscribing practices that are discriminatory in effect, if not in intent, to
carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause."158
156. Id. at 1990.
157. Id. at 1995 (Souter, J., concurring) (third alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(quoting State ex rel. Beattie v. Bd. of Educ., 172 N.W. 153 (Wis. 1919)).
158. Id. at 1986 (majority opinion). For further discussion of the intersection between equal
protection and disparate impact standards, see Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate
Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REv. 493 (2003).
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This resounding vindication of Congress's prophylactic enforcement
power clarifies a crucial aspect of equal protection enforcement that the
Garrett Court had left uncertain. 159 The 1964 Civil Rights Act's prohibition
on disparate impact discrimination 160 was extended to authorize damages
suits against the states only through the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act (EEOA) of 1972.161 The validity of the EEOA had been called into
question, however, because it prohibits the states from enacting facially
neutral regulations that have a disparate impact on women or African
Americans. While such regulations would not violate the Equal Protection
Clause, they do violate Title VII. 162 In the wake of Garrett's strict
application of the proportionality test, the Court's willingness to uphold the
application of Title VII to the states remained in serious doubt. In fact, as
Robert Post observed, the Hibbs oral argument and decision were
dominated by a recognition that "[i]f the Court were to decide Hibbs by
using the same harsh doctrinal tests that it had applied in Garrett . . , it is
likely that important provisions of Title VII would be struck down as
beyond Congress's Section 5 power."' 63 Just as Hibbs moved the Boerne
proportionality test away from Garrett's strict application to avoid such an
outcome, in Lane the Court's reasoning more directly confirms the validity
of the EEOA, including Title VII's proscriptions of disparate impact
conduct. What makes this possible is Lane's clear distinction between the
rights and the remedial conditions in applying the enforcement model.
Finally, beyond its sweeping evidentiary support to justify Congress's
added prophylactic power under Section 5, Lane's proportionality measure
of the specific accommodation duty also will drive future judicial review of
challenges to Title II. Under the remedial condition, Lane interprets the
proportionality standard to stress two elements in Title II that in the Court's
view make "[t]he remedy Congress chose... nevertheless a limited one."' 164
First, Title II applies "only when the individual seeking modification is
159. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372-73 (2001) (invalidating the Section 5 authority
for Title I, in part because "[tihe ADA also forbids [employer conduct] that disparately impact[s]
the disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis," and holding that "such
evidence [of disparate impact] alone is insufficient even where the Fourteenth Amendment
subjects state action to strict scrutiny").
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000).
161. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2, 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. (86 Stat. 103) 122 (codified in scattered sections of 5 and 42 U.S.C.).
162. But see Primus, supra note 158 (challenging prevailing distinctions between the Equal
Protection Clause and Title VII's disparate impact standard).
163. Post, supra note 33, at 19.
164. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1981 (2004); cf. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372 (finding
that Title I failed the remedial condition because "the accommodation duty far exceeds what is
constitutionally required in that it makes unlawful a range of alternative responses that would be
reasonable").
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otherwise eligible for the service."1 61 Congress limited the access
requirement by stipulating that the person seeking access must be a
"'qualified individual,"' which is to say "an individual with a disability
who, with or without reasonable modifications .... meets the essential
eligibility requirements for... participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.' 66 Without his or her disability, this individual
could gain entrance. The Court regarded this limitation on the reach of Title
II as evidence of its proportionality.
Second, the Court stressed the fact that Title II is a proportional remedy
because it requires "only 'reasonable modifications' that would not
fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided"'' 67 or result "in
undue financial and administrative burdens.' 68 Title II thus tailors its
requirements to the financial and physical environments in each state,
demanding that programs---"when viewed in [their] entirety"-be readily
accessible. 1
69
Together, these pragmatic vindications of the remedial condition recast
the jurisprudential backdrop informing future courts' proportionality
measure in challenges to Title II's equal protection and due process
enforcement. 170
IV. FEDERALISM AND THE SECTION 5 POWER
This Note has demonstrated how Lane deploys the rights and remedial
conditions in new ways that affirm the judiciary's interpretive authority and
simultaneously vindicate broader legislative power. Yet after Boerne, the
Court had also applied its conditions for valid Section 5 legislation
according to a jurisprudential framework altogether separate from its
claimed separation-of-powers duty to limit congressional encroachment on
the judiciary's interpretive exclusivity. Invoking states' sovereign immunity
to suit, the Rehnquist Court had used Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
to justify applications of the rights and remedial conditions that
165. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
167. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1993 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000)).
168. 28 C.F.R. § 35.150(a)(3) (2004); see also id. § 35.130(b)(7).
169. Id. § 35.150(a).
170. Already, the Supreme Court has vacated circuit and district court judgments declaring
that Title II exceeds Section 5, remanding these decisions to the courts for reconsideration in light
of Lane. See Parr v. Middle Tenn. State Univ., No. 02-5925, 2003 WL 21130027 (6th Cir. May
13, 2003), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2386 (2004); Phiffer v. Columbia River Corr. Inst.,
No. 01-35984, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 7577 (9th Cir. April 21, 2003), vacated and remanded, 124
S. Ct. 2386 (2004); Feaster v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 846 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003),
vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2387 (2004); Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety v. Rendon, 832 So.
2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2387 (2004).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1168 [Vol. 114:1133
Applying Section 5
circumscribed otherwise legitimate Section 5 power. The result has been
deep uncertainty about both the primacy of the Section 5 power and the
specific meaning of Eleventh Amendment federalism postulates for the
rights and remedial conditions. Lane focuses on this jurisprudential
confusion using the lens of due process enforcement, where "federal
interests are paramount."' 7 1 As this Part demonstrates, Lane restores the
Fourteenth Amendment's primacy over the Eleventh Amendment, thereby
vindicating the national government's power to enforce constitutional rights
standards against the states.
In recent decisions, the Rehnquist Court had invoked federalism to
justify invalidating Section 5 legislation, most frequently citing the
immunity against private damages suits given to the states by the Eleventh
Amendment. Garrett is a prime example. While the Court invalidated
Title I's enforcement authority, Justice Kennedy explained that
what is in question is not whether the Congress, acting pursuant to
a power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the States to
act. What is involved is only the question whether the States can be
subjected to liability in suits brought not by the Federal
Government... , but by private persons seeking to collect moneys
from the state treasury without the consent of the State.
172
Implicit here is the idea that the Section 5 enforcement power itself can be
restricted because all that is at stake is the right of private damages actions
against the states. The Court has specifically reassured us that the federal
power to enforce constitutional rights is not at stake, because suits for
injunctive relief against state officials for violations of federal standards
remain available under Ex parte Young, 173 and the federal government may
still sue for money damages.
174
This reasoning is strange, however, because the Fourteenth Amendment
was enacted after the Eleventh Amendment and accordingly trumps
Eleventh Amendment immunity. 175 This point was made by none other than
171. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
172. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
173. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing private suits to compel action by state officials).
174. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
175. Additionally, notwithstanding the reassurance of Garrett's limited impact on the Section
5 power, some lower courts had already applied the ruling to bar not only money damages directly
against a state but also injunctive relief against states. See, e.g., Ass'n for Disabled Ams. v. Fla.
Int'l Univ., 178 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1295 (S.D. Fla. 2001) ("The plaintiffs also argue that Garrett
does not apply to this case because the Supreme Court's ruling was limited to the question of
whether an individual could sue a state for money damages. The problem with this argument is
that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against an unconsenting state for injunctive relief as well
as for money damages.").
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored an opinion for the Court explicitly
holding that
the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty
which it embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement
provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In that section
Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce "by appropriate
legislation" the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which themselves embody significant limitations on
state authority. 
176
Despite this recognition of Section 5's priority, the Court's recent Section 5
decisions have, in effect, rendered the Section 5 power "necessarily limited
by" the Eleventh Amendment.
Lane reasserts the primacy of the Section 5 power in two significant
ways. First, Lane decisively overrules an application of the rights condition
that accorded the Eleventh Amendment priority over Section 5. Garrett had
effected the privileged invocation of federalism values in judicial scrutiny
of Section 5 by manipulating the rights condition's evidentiary requirement
according to the prescriptions of the Eleventh Amendment. In Garrett, the
Court held that even though cities and counties could violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, evidence of these violations could not be used in the rights
condition to establish Section 5 power, at least not to justify the kind of
Section 5 power that could trump Eleventh Amendment immunity: "[T]he
Eleventh Amendment does not extend its immunity to units of local
government.... It would make no sense to consider constitutional
violations on their part, as well as by the States themselves, when only the
States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh Amendment. '17 7 This reasoning
implies that even though Garrett declared that Title I as applied to the states
had failed the rights condition, Congress might still have Section 5 power
for Title I to bind cities and counties that do not enjoy the trumping power
of the Eleventh Amendment.
78
Lane directly and explicitly overrules Garrett's strange evidentiary
logic of Eleventh Amendment primacy:
176. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (citation omitted); see also Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999) ("We have held also that in adopting the Fourteenth
Amendment, the people required the States to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had been
preserved to them by the original Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits
against nonconsenting States pursuant to its § 5 enforcement power.").
177. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 369.
178. See, e.g., Reickenbacker v. Foster, 274 F.3d 974, 982 n.60 (5th Cir. 2001) ("This
narrowing of the analysis in Garrett means that Title II of the ADA could still be a valid exercise
of Congress' § 5 power, but simply not, provide the basis for a use of that power to
abrogate .... ).
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The Chief Justice [in dissent] dismisses as "irrelevant" the
portions of this evidence that concern the conduct of nonstate
governments. This argument rests on the mistaken premise that a
valid exercise of Congress' § 5 power must always be predicated
solely on evidence of constitutional violations by the States
themselves....
In any event, our cases have recognized that evidence of
constitutional violations on the part of nonstate government actors
is relevant to the § 5 inquiry. 179
Lane deliberately highlights evidence of the "failure of state and local
governments to provide interpretive services for the hearing impaired"'8 0 in
judicial programs and services. The Court used this evidence to establish
that Title II has fulfilled the rights condition, at least with respect to the
question of access to judicial services. Thus, while the Garrett Court
measured the rights condition according to the controlling prescriptions of
the Eleventh Amendment in order to reject an abundant record of
discrimination by local governments, Lane directly overrules that logic and
restores the primacy of the national enforcement power as governing states
and "their political subdivisions" alike.'
More broadly, the unusual nature of Title II of the ADA also led the
Court in Lane to reveal-and affirm-the true federal power at stake in its
Section 5 jurisprudence, exposing the potential impact of using federalism
values to restrict the national government's enforcement power. Even
without Section 5 power after Garrett, Congress could nevertheless enact
Title I pursuant to its Article I commerce power. Congressional commerce
power was sufficient to subject state officials to federal injunctive relief for
disability discrimination in employment.18 2 The same was true with respect
to Congress's power to prohibit age discrimination in Kimel. 8 3 Yet as the
petitioner, respondents, the Solicitor General, and even several Justices
noted during the oral argument in Lane, in the absence of Section 5
179. Tennessee v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1991 n.16 (2004) (capitalization altered) (citation
omitted).
180. Id. at 1991 (emphasis added).
181. Id. at 1990. In dissent, the Chief Justice claimed that "[tjhe bulk of the Court's evidence
concerns discrimination by nonstate governments, rather than the states themselves. We have
repeatedly held that such evidence is irrelevant to the inquiry whether Congress has validly
abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity, a privilege enjoyed only by the sovereign States." Id.
at 1999 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Yet none of the cases Rehnquist cites affirms this
proposition. Indeed, in the Florida Prepaid and Kimel citations, the Chief Justice wrote only of
the limited evidence available, without a single discussion of the evidentiary quality of local
government discrimination.
182. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9.
183. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000).
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authority it remained deeply uncertain whether Congress could justify the
enactment of Title II under its commerce power. Indeed, the Court might
have held mandates for access to voting booths, courthouses, and state
capitols to be simply too disconnected from interstate commerce. 
84
Title II, therefore, may have rested almost entirely on Congress's
Section 5 power. Without that power, Congress could not authorize even
private actions for injunctive relief against states that discriminated against
people with disabilities in ways affecting fundamental rights. Thus, the
Court faced the prospect of invalidating Title II's authority for these
fundamental rights arenas altogether, leaving "a country where it's okay if
the only places [people with disabilities] can't get into are the voting places,
the courthouse, the state capit[o]l, to the vessels of democracy .... [A]nd
there's nothing that the federal constitution has to say about it ....
Stepping back from this precipice, O'Connor joined the four Justices
who dissented in Florida Prepaid, Morrison, Kimel, and Garrett to
vindicate the Section 5 power to establish constitutional enforcement
standards that bind the states. The importance of distinguishing the national
power in Section 5 from federalism principles was evident in the Justices'
colloquy with Tennessee's advocate, Mr. Moore, during oral argument:
QUESTION: Mr. Moore, does Tennessee provide any cause of
action for the alleged violations here, the lack of access to the
courthouse?
MR. MOORE: No private right of action under our State Public
Buildings Act....
QUESTION: So you're satisfied that under Tennessee law,
there would be no monetary relief available?
MR. MOORE: I think that is-I think that is right.
184. The Court's recent narrowing of the commerce power has prompted this concern. See,
e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995). Several months after Garrett, Colorado not only challenged the Section 5 authority for
Title II but further "asserted a challenge to Congress' ability to pass Title II of the ADA pursuant
to the Interstate Commerce Clause." Thompson v. Colorado, 278 F.3d 1020, 1025 n.2 (10th Cir.
2001). But see Seth A. Horvath, Note, Disentangling the Eleventh Amendment and the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Alternative Remedies for State-Initiated Disability Discrimination Under
Title I and Title II, 2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 231, 264 (arguing, prior to Lane, that while the Court
seemed poised to invalidate Title 1I's Section 5 authority, "federal courts should generally favor
Exparte Young injunctive relief as a remedy for Title II violations").
185. American Constitution Society Panel Discussion on Tennessee v. Lane and the Future of
the Americans with Disabilities Act 58 (Jan. 13, 2004) (remarks of Patricia Millet), available at
http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/tennesseevianetranscript.pdf.
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QUESTION: And would there be any enforcement action at all
available to compel under Tennessee law the courthouses to be
accessible?
MR. MOORE: No, Your Honor .... But, of course, . . we do
not dispute that our state officials can be called to account for a
failure to comply with the provisions of Title II in an Ex parte
Young action.
QUESTION: Under what power? I guess-I guess you're
arguing that there's no section 5 authority-
MR. MOORE: Yes, Your Honor.
QUESTION: -for enactment of this provision. And that would
leave what, the Commerce Clause?
MR. MOORE: Yes, Your Honor.
QUESTION: And you think it would survive the Commerce
Clause challenge, do you, as applied to states?
MR. MOORE: ... Your Honor, ... this case doesn't present
that question.
QUESTION: But I'm asking.
MR. MOORE: But we have not challenged and do not question
Congress'-
QUESTION: Other states have though, have they not?' 86
To the extent that Lane posed a true question of federal power in Due
Process Clause enforcement, and not merely a question of the scope of
Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court's unwillingness to cabin federal
authority holds crucial implications for future review of Section 5
legislation. Lane pushed the Court to distinguish the federalism values that
had become bound up in applying the enforcement model as a means of
limiting congressional power. With the demise of the Second
186. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-7, Lane (No. 02-1667) (italics altered).
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Reconstruction's "jurisdictional compromise,"' 87 which had allowed
Congress's commerce power to suffice as authorization for
antidiscrimination mandates, Lane reveals the high stakes in constraining
the Section 5 power through judicial conditions that implicate far more than
"only the question whether the States can be subjected to liability... by
private persons seeking to collect moneys.' 188 Joining an as-applied review
of access to the courthouse preserve of constitutional rights in Lane, Justice
O'Connor completed a majority to confront this threat posed by
invalidation of Title II and vindicate the primacy of Congress's Section 5
power. Lane thus restores the traditional order of priority between the
Fourteenth and Eleventh Amendments.
CONCLUSION
On July 26, 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act became law with
near-unanimous bipartisan support in both houses of Congress and with
President George H.W. Bush declaring, "Let the shameful wall of exclusion
finally come tumbling down.', 189 Since that time, a struggle over Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement has emerged between coordinate branches of
government that few expected a decade ago. The Court's reconstructed
framework for Section 5 review has threatened a number of civil rights
secured over the past fifty years. Against this backdrop, the Lane Court
clarified the actual "metes and bounds" 190 of its own willingness to
constrain the congressional power in the setting of enforcement of the Due
Process Clause against the states.
Lane's application of what I have called the rights and remedial
conditions reveals the tension between competing visions of the
Constitution in the Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice's juricentric perspective would extend beyond the rights condition
intended to preserve the Court's exclusive interpretive authority, further
limiting Congress's long-recognized authority to remedy and deter future
deprivations of constitutional rights. The Court decisively rejected this
vision of the Constitution on the ground that it would stifle Congress's
remedial power to ensure meaningful access for people with disabilities.
Justice Ginsburg provided a portrait of an aspirational Constitution that
anchors the other end of the spectrum of constitutional visions enforceable
187. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 443 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
188. Bd. ofTrs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 376 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
189. Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 1990 PUB. PAPERS
1067, 1070 (July 26, 1990).
190. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368.
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through the Section 5 power, although her view did not receive a fifth vote.
Affirming the "equal-citizenship stature" of disabled Americans "among
people who count in composing 'We the People,"' Ginsburg endorsed the
law precisely because Congress's findings "sufficed to warrant the barrier-
lowering, dignity-respecting national solution the People's representatives
in Congress elected to order."' 9' It is this interaction between We the
People and Congress, affirming the dignity right of all citizens to access
their vessels of democracy, that is at stake in these contending visions.
1 92
While Lane affirms the Court's findamentally juricentric conception of
constitutional interpretation, it also reveals ways to vindicate a more
expansive Section 5 power with potentially far-reaching implications for
future review by the courts. By validating Title II's prophylactic
accommodation requirements to ensure courthouse accessibility for all
people with disabilities, Lane spotlights the importance of Congress's
democratic role and its institutional competence in giving practical content
to constitutional values. Although Lane limits the prophylactic endorsement
to the courthouse-access remedy, its implications for judicial review of
future challenges to the Section 5 power should not be underestimated.
Moreover, Lane illustrates clearly the true threat in the Court's recent use of
the Eleventh Amendment to restrict otherwise legitimate Section 5
legislation. Through the lens of Due Process Clause enforcement, Lane
reaffirms the importance of the national government's power to establish
constitutional rights standards that are binding on states' relationships with
their citizens. Together, these developments suggest Lane may mark a
turning point in Section 5 jurisprudence. Even as the Court may continue to
guard its interpretive authority through final judicial review, Lane shows
how the Court can create space for Congress's more pragmatic remedial
authority in the Section 5 "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation" the
constitutional rights enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment.
191. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1996-97 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
192. See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term-Foreword: The
Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARv. L. REv. 28, 35 (2004) ("Legally cast as
upholding Congress's unique power to enforce due process rights, even against state governments,
the decision might also be viewed as affirming the expressive dimensions of democratic
citizenship: equal access to the courthouse, like equal access to the ballot box, is virtually
constitutive of the very idea of citizenship ....").
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